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Abstract
In February of 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear weapons test. Speculations
are that this test was conducted to further develop a warhead small enough to fit on an
intercontinental ballistic missile. This test further strained North Korea's relationship with
the international community. North Korea has continued to make steps towards advancing
its military capabilities using nuclear weapons, and has even threatened an attack on U.S.
soil. The steps that North Korea are currently taking could have detrimental effects on the
stability of the region.
The role of enrchment technology in the nrodcition of niielpar weapons material and
the history of North Korea's nuclear program is described. The effect of a nuclear weapons
attack on the United States is presented and analyzed. The number of casualties could be
or is estimated to be on the order of several thousand people, in addition to the destruction
of infrastructure.
Although a highly unlikely scenario, these calculations have implications for future policy
decisions. This discussion shows the importance of verifying North Korea's nuclear program.
Verification would facilitate a better relationship between North Korea and the international
community. This could lead to economic support and security assurances for North Korea.
Furthermore, it would help the United States avoid a potential attack.
Thesis Supervisor: R. Scott Kemp
Title: Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
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1 Introduction
The ability to enrich uranium greatly increases the ability of a country to manufacture nuclear
weapons. Uranium enrichment is a major issue for international nuclear policy and security.
At present, there is particular interest in North Korea's uranium enrichment program.
Over the years it has been difficult to truly determine the extent of North Korea's nuclear
program. From facilities to nuclear tests, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
has made very clear that it will reveal information on its own terms. Furthermore, because
the international community has significant doubts about the capabilities of this program,
this allows North Korea to conduct space launches and nuclear tests as a way to provoke
fresh concern.
There are a variety of paths that North Korea could take in the next 5 to 10 years. The
uranium enrichment program would allow them to produce nuclear weapons using highly
enriched uranium (HEU). The HEU could then be used for warheads on intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could have the potential to reach the contiguous United
States (CONUS).
The first part of this thesis focuses on North Korea's nuclear program history. Enrichment
technology is discussed here to signify the difficulty in estimating the purpose and capability
of such a program. The next section focuses on the current status of the program and the
stockpile of the materials produced over the years. The final section focuses on a hypothetical
attack on the CONUS, its effects, and implications.
Although the likelihood of such an attack may be very low, based on DPRK capability
and likelihood of devastating U.S. retaliation, it is important to recognize the effects of such
an attack. These effects have major implications on policy as the United States assembles
defense measures and prepares strategies for attending to North Korea.
2 Enrichment Technology
In the past, gaseous diffusion and plutonium production were methods used to acquire the
fissile material needed to fabricate a nuclear weapon. However, uranium enrichment has
become more popular. The technology most used for this process is the gas centrifuge. The
gas centrifuge is the most economically efficient way to enrich [1]. However, its properties
allow it to easily be transformed and used for non-peaceful purposes, such as the production
of HEU for nuclear weapons.
The gas centrifuge uses centrifugal force to separate chemically identical isotopes by the
variation in isotopic weight. To do this, a hollow cylindrical tube is spun at very high
speeds about its axis. This creates a product stream and waste stream. However, a single
centrifuge cannot simultaneously produce useful enrichment levels and product flow rates.
Thus, centrifuges are connected in cascades. Connecting the centrifuges in series allows
the enrichment level to be increased, and connecting the centrifuges in parallel, allows the
product flow rate to be increased. In the cascade, each row of parallel centrifuges is called
a stage. The number of stages is determined by the performance of each centrifuge and the
desired enrichment level [1].
Unfortunately, there are two specific properties of centrifuges that make safeguards dif-
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ficult, rapid breakout and clandestine plants. Rapid breakout is the speed with which any
peaceful-use plant can be converted to non-peaceful purposes. As described in Wood, Glaser,
and Kemp, "even for a first-generation centrifuge, the gas needs only to pass through a series
of 30-40 stages to reach the high enrichment levels used in nuclear weapons. The combina-
tion of few total stages with the short equilibrium time per stage produces a breakout time
line that is also small. A cascade designed to produce low-enriched uranium for fuel can be
re-fed its low-enriched product and begin converting it to highly enriched uranium suitable
for weapons use in a matter of days - a procedure called batch recycling. Alternatively, the
machines can be reconfigured into a narrower but longer cascade with more stages, a process
that requires additional time before production of highly enriched uranium can begin but is
more efficient than batch recycling [1]." This allows the proliferating country the opportu-
nity to produce HEU before the international community has a chance to act. Also, Wood,
Glaser, and Kemp state that, "compared with nuclear reactors and large gaseous-diffusion
plants, a centrifuge plant uses little electricity and produces little detectable signal, so it
is much easier to hide the plant and evade safeguards altogether [1]." These characteristics
make it hard to distinguish centrifuge plants from normal industrial facilities. Thus, allowing
a non-proliferating state to quickly become a proliferating state without any indications of
this action to the international community.
3 North Korea's Nuclear Program
This section gives an overview of the history of North Korea's nuclear program.
Preparation for a Nuclear Program
North Korea's nuclear program did not appear to be a threat until the mid 1980s, when the
weapons program emerged [2]. However, the beginning of the nuclear program is estimated
to date back to the 1950s.
Using Korean labor, Moscow undertook uranium mining in northern Korea, as early as
1946. North Korea's earliest known interest in nuclear technology was for peaceful pur-
poses and that their first discussions of nuclear weapons, including reported preparations
for defense against nuclear attack, date from this period [3]. The DPRK's first generation
of nuclear scientists were educated in Japanese universities during the 1930s and returned
to Korea in the mid and late 1940s. These scientists ties to Japan provided North Korea
with early access to nuclear expertise and technology. Some of the DPRK's earliest nuclear
weapons research took place at the Atomic Energy Research Institute. The Atomic Energy
Research Institute was founded in 1952 under its Academy of Sciences. Lee Sung-ki' was
named the first director [3]. The first generation scientists then oversaw the training of a
second generation of nuclear specialists, many of whom benefited from advanced training
in the Soviet Union. Subsequent generations were trained in North Korea but also gained
knowledge from international contacts [3].
In 1956, the Soviet Union and the DPRK signed agreements on the peaceful use of atomic
energy and on research collaboration in nuclear science. Soviet documents also allude to an
'Lee Sung-ki is a chemist best known for the invention of vinalon, also know as 'juche fibre' in the DPRK.
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inquiry from Pyongyang on the provision of power reactors [3]. In September 1959, they
signed a protocol enabling joint nuclear projects. This included planning for nuclear activities
near Yongbyon, which was designated as a Special District of the State Administrative
Council and thus contained more tightly controlled access [3].
The Atomic Energy Research Center was established in Yongbyon in November 1962.
The Soviet Union transferred an IRT-2000 2MWt research reactor and additional equipment.
Additional facilities were built including a radio chemical lab for isotope separation and waste
storage sites. All of these facilities were constructed according to Soviet-supplied blueprints,
with total costs in 1962 estimated at a U.S. $500 million [3].
The Buildings of the Nuclear Program
In 1980, Pyongyang started a major campaign to build a series of industrial-scale nuclear
facilities that were intended to produce weapons grade plutonium and nuclear energy. This
program was comprised of three gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural uranium fueled
reactors. Figure 1 shows an overview of North Korea's nuclear program.
[4]
Figure 1: North Korea's nuclear program
North Korea began mining uranium at various locations in the late 1970s or early 80s. The
raw uranium-bearing ore was shipped to milling factories, processed to produce uranium ore
concentrate or 'yellowcake', and then transported to the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center
for further processing and fabrication. Typically, one tonne of North Korean uranium ore
contains about one kilogram of uranium [4]. Therefore, about 50,000 tonnes of ore had to
be mined and processed in order to obtain 50 tonnes of the natural uranium needed for the
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initial fuel load for the 5MWe reactor [4]. Between 1980 and 1985, North Korea built a
factory at Yongbyon that would refine yellowcake and produce uranium metal fuel elements
for its graphite-moderated reactors. According to North Korean officials, in 1992, the plant
was producing roughly 100 t of uranium fuel per year, equal to approximately 16,000 fuel
assemblies [4].
The 5MWe research reactor was operated from 1986 to 1994, when it was shut down un-
der the Agreed Framework. However, the operational history of the reactor during this time
is shrouded in mystery. From April to May 1989, the reactor was reportedly shut down to
remove a few hundred damaged fuel rods. North Korea claimed that after the fuel removal,
the reactor was able to operate more regularly at 20 MWt, close to full power. During the
initial International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in April 1992, North Korea
claimed that about 17kg of plutonium had been produced. By the time the reactor was com-
pletely de-fueled, the spent fuel probably contained about 25-30 kg of plutonium. In theory,
operating at full power for 300 days per year, this reactor could produce approximately 7.5
kg of weapons grade plutonium annually in the discharged spent fuel. Actual annual plu-
tonium production would depend on the fuel's irradiation level, which is a function of the
reactor's power level and the number of days per year that it was operational [4].
The DPRK also started to construct larger reactors. In 1984, North Korea began con-
structing a 50 MWe reactor at Yongbyon. This reactor was theoretically capable of producing
about 55 kg of weapons grade plutonium per year. Construction also began on a 200 MWe,
which was a full-scale version of the 50 MWe reactor. If operated at full power, this reactor
is theoretically capable of producing up to 220 kg of weapons grade plutonium. However,
with the signing of the Agreed Framework, this construction was frozen [4].
Also in 1984, North Korea began construction of an industrial-scale reprocessing plant.
Reprocessing separates plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel. at the Yongbyon Nuclear
Research Center. The reprocessing purpose was confirmed by the IAEA in 1992. The IAEA
also discovered that one reprocessing line had been completed at the plant and that a second
was under construction. According to North Korean officials, at that time, the facility was
designed to process approximately one tonne of spent fuel over three days of continuous
operation. In 1994, the IAEA discovered that North Korea had made considerable progress
in installing equipment for the second reprocessing line, which was scheduled for completion
in 1996. Theoretically, the facility's one completed line is capable of processing the 5MWe
reactor's entire 50t core load in a single campaign, lasting approximately 150 days. If both
lines were operating continuously for 300 days per year, the plant would have been more
than sufficient to handle the spent fuel that would typically be discharged each year by the
5MWe and 50 MWe reactors [4].
North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency
Pyongyang acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on April 18, 1985. From 1992 to
1993, the IAEA conducted six inspections. As previously stated, North Korea informed the
IAEA as part of the initial inspection process that it had conducted a one-time plutonium
extraction experiment on "damaged" fuel rods removed from the 5 MWe reactor in 1989. The
IAEA was given access to the small amount separated. The small amount was approximately
90 grams, or less than 1/40th of the amount required to build a nuclear device [2]. The
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IAEA's chemical analysis of the samples, however, contradicted North Korea's claims that
it had previously separated only the 90 grams of plutonium on one occasion. Instead, the
IAEA results indicate that the North had separated plutonium in four campaigns over a
three-year period, starting in 1989. On February 11, 1993, Hans Blix officially requested a
"special inspection" of the two suspected waste sites, marking the first time in the IAEA's
history that it had used its right to conduct such visits. Although these sites had been
visited by the IAEA during the third inspection in September 1993, North Korea did not
permit full access to the sites, which were not included in its "initial declaration." Ten days
later, North Korea's Atomic Energy Minister informed Blix that the DPRK was refusing the
IAEA's special inspection request. On March 12, North Korea stated through letter, that it
was exercising its right of withdrawal from the NPT, to take effect in 90 days. After a round
of negotiations with the United States in June 1993, North Korea agreed to "suspend" its
withdrawal one day short of the 90-day countdown. However, North Korea asserted that it
was no longer a full party to the NPT and that the IAEA no longer had the right to conduct
even normal routine and ad hoc inspections. In the following months, Pyongyang severely
constrained the IAEA inspection activities that were needed to preserve the "continuity of
safeguards." This led Blix to declare in December 1993 that IAEA safeguards in North Korea
could no longer provide "any meaningful assurances" that nuclear materials were not being
diverted to weapons uses.
In March 1994, as part of a complicated package deal with the United States, North
Korea initially agreed to an IAEA inspection of its declared facilities, but it then blocked the
IAEA from taking key radioactive samples at the plutonium extraction plant at Yongbyon.
nnt_ 1W~ T. __t TZ.The crisis escalated further in May 1994, when INorhL Korea announced that it was going
to defuel its 5 MWe reactor. The need for the IAEA to gain access to the fuel removed
became of international concern for two reasons: 1) the fuel contained up to 30 kilograms
of plutonium, and 2) getting access to the fuel and taking appropriate samples, the IAEA
could determine whether the fuel had been in the reactor since its initial operation in 1986,
or if the fuel was a second batch. If there was a second batch, this would indicate that North
Korea had indeed removed an entire load of fuel from the reactor during the 1989 shutdown
[2].
On October 12, 1994, North Korea signed the Agreed Framework. There were many
terms in the agreement. Mainly, it required North Korea to freeze and eventually disman-
tle its nuclear facilities and eliminate its nuclear weapons capabilities in exchange for the
construction of two modern nuclear power reactors. The nuclear facilities frozen were key
facilities needed for the plutonium production program and included the uranium conversion
and fuel fabrication plant, the 5 MWe, 50 MWe, 200 MWe reactors, and the reprocessing
facility [4]. The agreement also required North Korea to remain a member of the NPT and to
come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement once a "significant portion of
the light water reactor (LWR) project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear com-
ponents." In return, the United States pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against the DPRK. The agreement also included a North Korean commitment to implement
the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,
which banned uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing in the entire peninsula [2].
However, the IRT-2000 reactor and its related radio chemical laboratory were exempt from
the freeze because they could be used to produce radioisotopes for medical and industrial
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purposes, but these facilities were subject to IAEA inspections. Furthermore, to verify that
the facilities were not operating and that all construction had been terminated, the IAEA
placed seals on the main access points, installed monitoring devices, and stationed a small
team of resident inspectors at Yongbyon [2]. These inspectors were allowed to conduct
short-notice inspections of different parts of the facilities subject to the freeze [4].
To supply North Korea with the two LWRs, which had a "target date" of 2003, an
international consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
was formed. The countries that made up the organization at the beginning were the United
States, Japan, and South Korea [4]. The concrete foundations of the first reactor were laid
in August 2002. However, no significant nuclear components were delivered for the LWRs
because North Korea was first required to account for its plutonium production prior to 1992.
Although, the Agreed Framework did not require immediate North Korean compliance to
account for the plutonium produced before 1992. After many discussions and the uncovering
of North Korea's clandestine uranium enrichment program, the Agreed Framework collapsed
in late 2002 [4]. KEDO stopped shipments of heavy oil to North Korea in December 2002 [5].
As a result, North Korea disabled IAEA monitoring equipment at the 5 MWe reactor, the
spent-fuel storage pond and the reprocessing facility, expelled IAEA inspectors, and took
steps to revive its plutonium production program. In April 2003, North Korea withdrew
from the NPT [4].
Six-Party Talks
In an effort to resolve the crisis, six-party talks commenced in August 2003. The members
of the group were the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea.
Two more rounds of six-party talks took place in 2004. In February 2005, North Korea
decided to suspend indefinitely its participation in the six-party talks because they felt it
was serving no purpose. North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that hostile
bilateral relations, specifically the Bush administration's nuclear threat against the DPRK,
the suggestion that military force could be used to depose the current government, and
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's labeling of the DPRK as an "outpost of tyranny"
caused this decision [5]. It was also announced at this time, because of Japan's increased
hostility, that North Korea had built nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. In July 2005,
with pressure from Beijing, North Korea decided to rejoin the six-party talks [5]. The six-
parties issued a Joint Statement on how to achieve verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, in September 2005 [6]. However, with the freezing of DPRK funds by the United
States, the six-party talks were again boycotted in November 2005. This led to the testing
of a nuclear device in October 2006 [5].
On February 13, 2007, North Korea reached an agreement with the other members of
the six-party talks to begin the initial phase of implementing the Joint Statement. Phase
1 included the shut-down of plutonium production at the Yongbyon nuclear complex in
exchange for an initial fuel oil shipment. Phase 2 included the disablement of facilities at
Yongbyon and a "complete and correct" declaration of DPRK nuclear activities, in exchange
for the delivery of fuel oil and the removal of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and
the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) designations. North Korea submitted a declaration
of its past plutonium production activities in June 2008. With this, President Bush removed
10
North Korea from the TWEA list but would only remove the SST designation when North
Korea agreed to verification provisions. However, North Korea did not accept initial U.S.
verification proposals and threatened to restart reprocessing plutonium in September 2008.
In October 2008, a bilateral agreement on verification was reached and North Korea was
then removed from the SST list. Yet, the agreement was verbal, and North Korea claimed
that it did not agree to sampling at nuclear sites. This sampling is a key element in verifying
past plutonium production [6]. The six-parties met in December 2008, but did not reach an
agreement on verification measures. Disablement at Yongbyon continued through April 2009,
when North Korea expelled international monitors. Afterward, North Korea announced it
would restart its reprocessing plant and boasted progress in uranium enrichment technology
development. Soon after, North Korea tested another nuclear device. Six-party talks have
not been held since spring 2009 [6].
4 Uranium Enrichment
Some experts believe North Korea's interest in enrichment technology dates back to the
1970s. North Korea's efforts of centrifuge procurement accelerated during the 1990s when
they provided Nodong missiles to Pakistan in exchange for centrifuge parts and technology
arranged through A.Q. Khan. According to former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf,
Khan transferred nearly two dozen centrifuges to North Korea along with "a flow meter, some
special oils for centrifuges, and coaching on centrifuge technology, including visits to top-
secret centrifuge plants [4]." Also, Khan reportedly provided a "shopping list" to North Korea,
which would have enabled Pyongyang to purchase additional components directly from other
foreign suppliers. An unclassified CIA report to U.S. Congress dated November 19, 2002,
argued that by 2001 North Korea had begun "seeking centrifuge-related materials in large
quantities" and had "obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal
systems." The report also concluded that North Korea was "constructing a plant that could
produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when
fully operational, which could be as soon as mid-decade [7]." In April 2003, a shipment
of aluminum tubing from a German company, intended for North Korea, was intercepted.
In total, one North Korean procurement agent is known to have sought enough aluminum
tubing for about 6,700 centrifuges. North Korea did manage to obtain 150t of tubing from
a Russian company. This is approximated to be enough for 2,700 centrifuges, which are
sufficient to produce about 55 kg of HEU annually, or about two nuclear weapons (assuming
25 kg of HEU needed for each device) [4].
In April 2009, North Korea claimed that it would begin enriching uranium. This uranium
would be used to fuel their future LWR. In September 2009, the DPRK announced that their
"experimental uranium enrichment [had] successfully been conducted to enter into completion
phase." However, the technical implications of this statement were unclear until a year later.
In November 2010, Siegfried Hecker and two Stanford University colleagues were invited to
visit Yongbyon, where they were shown a modern-looking uranium enrichment facility. The
facility contained approximately 2,000 centrifuges.2 The enrichment capacity of the facility
2This is the number claimed by North Korea. It is also the upper limit of how many would fit in the
limited floor space [4].
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was said to be 8,000 separative work units3 (SWU) per year, or 4 SWU per machine. If true,
this is double the capacity of Pakistan's P-1 centrifuge and slightly less than the 5 SWU
design capacity of Pakistan's second-generation P-2 centrifuges. Intelligence agencies that
debriefed Hecker concluded that the machines he saw were P-2s. North Korea's stated SWU
capacity would be sufficient to produce about 2.5t of LEU in the form of UF 6 a year. This
would be enough for the needs of the 25-30 MWe experimental LWR North Korea said it had
built. However, Hecker judged that the centrifuges could be reconfigured to produce 30-40
kg of HEU annually, sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon. Hecker and others have also
assessed that it is more likely that the centrifuge and related equipment had been assembled
in another location, and then transferred to Yongbyon [4]. If this is the case the amount of
uranium produced could be even greater depending on the capabilities of the other location.
5 Nuclear Tests
North Korea conducted underground atomic test at Phunggye in October 2006 and May
2009. A third nuclear test was conducted on February 12, 2013.
The first test on October 9, 2006, had a range of reported yields. Most estimates, based
on seismic data, fell below 1 kiloton (kt). A press release from the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), on October 16, stated that the detection of radioactive debris
confirmed that a nuclear test had taken place, and that the yield of the explosion was "less
than a kiloton". Hecker was later told by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that China
had been told that the expected yield would be around 4kt. The North Koreans told Hecker
that only 2 kg of plutonium had been used in this test [4].
The second test, which took place on May 25, 2009, appeared to be more successful.
Seismic data suggested that this device had achieved a higher yield, of up to 4 kt. However,
unlike the detonation in 2006, no radioactive debris were detected. Although the 2009 test
was more successful than the one in 2006, the expected yield was significantly smaller than
the 10 - 20 kt range expected for a first generation, Nagasaki-type design. A comparison of
the first tests of nuclear states is shown in figure 2. Various theories have been presented
as explanations for the low yields of both tests. The theories presented in the text were: 1)
North Korea used a small amount of plutonium in order to conserve its stockpile, 2) North
Korea intended the tests to have a smaller yield so as to contain the blast more effectively,
and 3) North Korea tested a design with an intentionally smaller yield and/or one which
used less plutonium, so as to assist with the development of a warhead deliverable by ballistic
missile [4].
3 The Separative Work Unit or SWU is a measure of work expended during an enrichment pro-
cess. It factors in the feed material, the waste (or stripped) material, and the product (or en-
riched) material. Here, the unit is defined as SWU per year which refers to separative power.
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/effects/swu.html
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Table 9: Yields of previous first nuclear tests
Country Year EstimatedVield(kT) Material
us 1945 20 Plutonium
USSR 1949 21 Plutonium
UK 1952 20 Plutonium
France 1960 60-70 Plutonium
China 1964 22 HEU
India 1974 12-15 Plutonium
Pakistan 1998 13-18* HEU
North Korea 2006 1 Plutonium
*For six claimed tests, though US believes only three devices were
tested
Sources: Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organisation Preparatory Commission;
Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise iprofieration netwrks
(IISS, 207). [4]
Figure 2: Comparison of the first nuclear tests yields. It is important to note how small the
DPRK's yield was to that of the other states.
On February 12, 2013, a third nuclear test was carried out. The South Korean Ministry
of Defense estimated that the test yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons. North Korea claimed
that this test was to develop a "smaller and light" warhead. It is not known if this was a
plutonium or uranium device, but it is assumed that this test would likely contribute to
North Korea's ability to develop a warhead that could be mounted on a long-range missile
[6].
6 Current Status of the Nuclear Program
North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment plant in 2009, but stated that its
purpose was for the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea
showed Hecker and colleagues, early construction of a 100 MWt (~ 33 MWe) LWR in addition
to a uranium enrichment plant at the Yongbyon site. This topic will be discussed in the next
section. No construction has occurred at the 50 MWe or 200 MWe gas graphite reactors
built by the DPRK since 2002 [6]. Figure 3 shows the nuclear power projects that North
Korea has worked on.
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Location TypefPower Capacity Status Purpose
Yongbyon Graphke-moderated Heavy Currendy shut-down; Weapons-grade pluconawn
Water Experimenal cooling cower destroyed in producdon
Reactor/5 MWe june 2009 as parr of Sb-
PWry Taes; estimated
restart: dme would be 6
months
Yongbyon Graphke-moderted Heavy Never bul; Basic Stated purpose was
Water Power Reactor /50 construction begu project electricity produedon;
MWe halted since 1994 could have been used for
weapons-grde plutonium
producion
Yongbyon Expernental Light-Water U.S. observers saw basic Stated purpose is elecrity
Reaccorf100 MWT (25-30 construction begun in producan; could be used
MWe) November 2010; Reactor for weapons-grade
dome emplaced on top of pknuonium producdon
conakunent struenare
summer 2012
Taechon Graphite-moderated Heavy Never buillc Basic Stated purpoe was
Water Power Reactor/200 costruction begun; project electriciy produtdon;
MWe haked since 1994 could have been used for
weaponsgade plutonium
production
Kumbo Disaict Sinp'o 4 LgVt-water reactors40 Never buk part of 1985 Stated purpose is electricky
MW deal with SedeE Union producdoni could have
when North Korea s4psed been used for weapons-
the NPT: canceled by grade pknalun
Russian Federation in 1992 production
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Figure 3: North Korean Nuclear Power Projects
The two projects that are currently being observed by the international community are
the experimental LWR and the 5 MWe reactor. Satellite imagery from May to June 2012,
shows construction progressing at the Yongbyon LWR [8]. As shown in figure 3, a dome was
placed on top of the containment structure in the summer of 2012. In an article, the IAEA
is quoted saying that "significant progress" had been made in the reactor's construction since
its previous report in 2011. This progress also included indications that some components
may have been installed inside the building and a system for pumping water from a river to
the reactor for cooling purposes has also been built, the IAEA report said. Experts estimate
that the reactor could be completed in the second half 2013 [9]. In addition to the work
on the LWR complex, construction activity occurred on a series of buildings to the north of
the LWR. Roofing was stripped off two adjacent buildings which were then combined into a
single building with a common roof, which is visible in imagery taken on June 5, 2012 [8].
North Korea announced plans to restart the 5 MWe in April 2013, as shown in figure
3. Satellite imagery shows that in the six weeks prior to this announcement construction
activity started at the 5 MWe reactor. From the imagery, there appears to excavation that
is speculated to be related to replacing the sections of the secondary cooling loop that were
cut and removed in accordance with the six-party agreement. It is also proposed that North
Korea may simply connect the secondary cooling system to the pump house built for its new
LWR which is located next to the old reactor, instead of building a new cooling tower [10].
Other facilities have also had construction activities. The fuel fabrication facility, which
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houses a gas centrifuge plant, in a February 3, 2012 image showed three building under
construction. In the June 5, 2012 image, one of the buildings appeared completed while
construction continued on the other two buildings. Construction was also seen on February
3, 2012, taking place at the radiochemical lab, which was used to separate plutonium from
irradiated fuel. The image shows a clear patch on the roof of one of the support buildings,
which suggests a source of considerable heat under that part of the roof. In later images,
that section of the building does not show any distinguishing factors. It is speculated that
this building may store hot radioactive waste or have another source of heat [8].
Stockpile
This section discusses the estimates of the production of weapons grade material will be
discussed.
Plutonium Production
A great deal of uncertainty remains concerning the amount of plutonium produced by North
Korea before 1992 [4]. A reasonable conclusion is that no more than 10 kilograms of pluto-
nium were separated prior to 1994. Until 2003, the bulk of plutonium produced by North
Korea remained in almost 8,000 irradiated fuel rods, stored in a pond near the 5 MWe reactor
and subject to monitoring by the IAEA. Since restarting the Radiochemical Lab in 2003,
North Korea is believed to have reprocessed most of the 8,000 irradiated fuel rods [11].
The amount of plutonium in a natural-uraniim fiield corp can be Ptimaitpd with the
following equation:
Plutonium = P * C * 365 * 0.9x10- 3  (1)
where P is the reactor's thermal power in MWt, C is the capacity factor4 times the number
of days the reactor runs per year5 , and the last factor is a standard plutonium conversion
factor in kg/MWtd for a gas-graphite reactor when the plutonium is weapons grade [12].
During the six-party disablement process in 2008, North Korea declared that it had about
30 kilograms of separated plutonium. This net value reflected plutonium consumed by the
2006 underground test and the inevitable loss of some plutonium in the operation of the
plutonium separation plant. The last reactor core reportedly contained about 8 kilograms
of plutonium, increasing North Korea's declared total to 38 kilograms prior to the 2009 test.
Subtracting the estimated amount used for the test, the DPRK is estimated to have a stock
of 34-36 kilograms of plutonium for nuclear weapons [13].
Furthermore, the LWR is estimated to be 100 MWt, or 4 to 5 times larger than the exist-
ing Yongbyon reactor, which could produce about 20 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium
per year [13].
4The capacity factor represents the ratio of the total annual heat output to the annual heat output based
on continual full-power operation. This ratio is often stated to be the fraction of the year that the reactor
operates at full power [12].
5 This factor can be changed based on the number of days the reactor is running, this specific equation
studies the annual production of weapons grade plutonium [12].
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Uranium Production
It is very difficult to estimate the amount of uranium, especially weapons grade uranium
(WGU), without knowing specifics about the facility. North Korea has stated that the plant's
total enrichment capacity is 8,000 separative work units per year. With 2,000 centrifuges,
the average would be 4 SWU per year per centrifuge. This could produce approximately 40
kg of HEU per year [13]. Assuming that the North Korea acquired HEU for 3 years and
that each weapon would need about 25 kg of material, this would allow North Korea to have
approximately 4 nuclear weapons that it could use on it's ICBMs.
7 Scenario
This is a hypothetical example of the outcome of a nuclear attack on the city of Los Angeles,
California. The selection of this city was chosen mainly for location and the fact that it is
the second most populated city in the United States.
Weapons Delivery
Missile History
North Korea has conducted a number of missile tests. In April 2005, the DIA's director
stated in a congressional testimony that the Taepodong-2 could potentially deliver a nuclear
warhead to the United States. In March 2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) director
stated that "North Korea may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic
missile." Two years later the new director testified that North Korea could "have several
plutonium-based warheads that it can deliver by ballistic missiles and aircraft as well as by
unconventional means [4]." In June 2009, Postal and Wright said of North Korea's ballistic
missile capability that if the Unha-2 was designed to launch a relatively lightweight satellite,
its structure may not allow it to carry a 1,000 kilogram warhead. If it could carry this
weight, the estimate is that it could have a range of 10,000 to 10,500 kilometers, allowing it
to reach Alaska, Hawaii, and roughly half of the lower 48 states. If a 1,000 kilogram payload
were launched by the first two stages of the missile, it could have a range of 7,000 to 7,500
kilometers. This would limit the range to only Alaska and parts of Hawaii [14].
In December 2012, North Korea, after many failed attempts, finally boosted a small
satellite into orbit using a domestically assembled Unha-3 rocket. Susan Rice, the U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations, in referencing this launch, asserted that North Korea
had fired "a multistage rocket using ballistic missile technology." The technologies of space
launchers and long-range ballistic missiles are very similar. Both use powerful rocket engines,
high-strength and lightweight airframes, inertial navigation and guidance units, and payload
separation mechanisms. However, key features differentiate the two systems, apart from the
payload itself. Of these features, one of the most important is re-entry technology. Protecting
a long-range missile's payload from the extreme heat and structural loads experienced during
re-entry requires the development and production of special material. This material must
be tested and validated under real conditions. Thus, the universal trend has been to convert
ballistic missiles into space launchers, not the opposite. However, it is stated that North
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Korea could contemplate using the Unha-3 as the basis for an ICBM [15]. If North Korea
were able to further develop this technology, it is possible that this ICBM could reach the
United States.
Postulated Delivery Vehicles
Currently, the missile that is assumed to be used to target the United States is the KN-08
ICBM. This was the missile displayed at the military parade in Pyongyang on April 15,
2012. Although, it is assumed that these displays were mock-ups, it is plausible that North
Korea intends to build a road-mobile ICBM. In an article by John Schilling, he attempts to
reverse engineer the design of an actual missile behind these mock-ups. These estimates are
presented below and will be used as the basis for weapons delivery in this scenario [16].
From an image of one the several KN-08 missiles displayed, Schilling was able to estimate
the dimensions of the missile and produce four different configurations based on the technol-
ogy that North Korea has proven to possess or could possess in the near future. The first
stage is assumed to use two Nodong engines. The R-27 engine is a submerged engine6 , and
cannot be clustered without substantial redesign. However, Schilling presents a "KN-08D"
option which uses a cluster of three modified R-27 engines in the first stage. The second
stage could use a variety of engines. For the third stage, only the R-27 engine is considered
because of the overall length of the upper stage. In all three stages, propellant tanks are
assumed to fill all space not required by engine bays or other equipment, with a minimum
of 5 cm dynamic clearance between engines and tanks of successive stages 7. The dimension
estimates and configurations are shown below in figure 4.
6A submerged engine is one in which the placement of the engine is within the fuel tank, this reduces the
external dimensions. For more information on the structure of the R-27 engine, please see the article located
here: http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets 1/Diverse/R-27/
7For a detailed account of each configuration please see the article located here:
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/01/Schilling-KN-08-Assessment-small.pdf
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Figure 4: The Four Postulated KN-08 Configurations
[16]
For this scenario, the missile is assumed to launch from Musudan-ri as it does in Schilling's
paper. To calculate the ground track of the missile the following equation is used:
cosA = sinLosinLT + cosLocosLTcosAl (2)
Al = IT - lo
where A is the range angle (in degrees), range angle from the launcher to the target, LO
and 10 are the latitude and longitude of the launcher, and LT and 1T are the latitude and
longitude of the target. To get kilometers, the range angle is multiplied by 10,000 km/90*
[17]. Using this equation, the ground track from Musudan-ri to Los Angeles is approximately
7,700 km.8 To calculate the maximum range of each missile configuration, the burnout radius
and velocity must be calculated. The constants used in these calculations are shown in Table
1. The equations and calculations can be found in the Appendix. This calculation assumes
a throw weight of 1000 kilograms and a weapon yield of 10 kt.
8 For exact values see Appendix 9.
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Engine dual Nodong engine single Nodong engine R-27 engine
Isp (at sea level) 225 225 265
Total Wet Mass (kg) 18250 10000 4675
Burnout Mass (kg) 2325 1275 700
Engine dual Nodong engine dual Scud engine R-27 engine
Isp (at sea level) 225 225 265
Total Wet Mass (kg) 18250 13200 4675
BurnoutMassikg) 2325 1685 700
Engine dual Nodong engine R-27 engine R-27engine
Isp (at sea level) 225 265 265
Total Wet Mass (kg) 18250 13200 4675
Burnout Mass 2325 1685 700
Engine triple R-27 engine R-27 engine R-27engine
Isp (at sea level) 265 265 265
Total Wet Mass (kg) 22000 15250 4675
Burnout Mass (kg) 2900 2000 700[16
Table 1: Constants for Each Missile Configuration
From these calculations, KN-08C is the configuration of choice for this scenario as its
calculated maximum range is approximately 9,700 km. Although KN-08D, has a longer
range, KN-08C seems to be more attainable in the near future for North Korea.
Weapons Type
The Schilling article presents two possibilities for the type of warhead, either a gun-assembly
fission bomb or a first-generation thermonuclear weapon with cylindrical primaries [16]. This
scenario assumes a gun-type assembly. This design is one in which one piece of weapons grade
uranium is fired into a second piece of WGU in order to create a supercritical mass. Unlike
an implosion device, which can have either plutonium or uranium as its fissile core, a gun
type device can only be built with HEU because spontaneous neutrons emitted by plutonium
are likely to cause premature criticality which can significantly reduce the overall explosive
yield [4]. This is an important assumption as it greatly limits the number of warheads that
North Korea could use with this weapon-design.
Weapons Effects
In this scenario, the KN-08C missile configuration is chosen. This missile then travels to Los
Angeles, CA and detonates a 10 kt bomb. This section discusses the weapons effects based
on the yield of the weapon.
Equations for Approximation
The size of the fireball increases with the energy yield of the explosion. Thus the radius of
the fireball can be calculated by the following equation,
R - 90W 4  (3)
where R is the radius in feet and W is the yield in kilotons. Theoretically, a given pressure
will occur at a distance from an explosion that is proportional to the cube root of the energy
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yield. Full-scale tests have shown this relationship between distance and energy yield to hold
for yields up to (and including) the megaton range. Thus, cube root scaling may be applied
over a wide range of explosion energies. According to this law, if D1 is the distance (or slant
range) from a reference explosion of Wi, kilotons, at which certain overpressure or dynamic
pressure is attained, then for any explosion of W kilotons energy these same pressure will
occur at a distance D given by,
D = )1/3 (4)
D1  W1
but this equation is simplified by choosing a reference explosion of 1 kt so thatW1 = 1.
Therefore Equation 4 is reduced to:
D = Di * W1/ 3  (5)
Scaling laws are used to calculate many of the characteristics of an explosion such as the
optimal height of burst. The optimal height of burst is the burst height that will result in a
maximum surface distance from ground zero to which an overpressure extends. The optimal
height of burst, for an overpressure of 10 psi or more, is given by the following equation,
H = 220(W)1/ 3  (6)
For many of the effects such as radiant exposure, overpressure, and dosage, scaling is
used to find the distance at which a given parameter can happen or the magnitude of an
effect. The technique is to scale down the given height of burst or distance to the reference
yield of 1 kt, using Equation 5.9 Then using graphs for the 1 kt bomb, the value of the effect
is determined, and finally scaled back up to the original bomb yield. The calculations used
for this scenario can all be found in the Appendix [18].
Effects on Los Angeles
The effects radii using the above equations are shown in Figure 5 below using Nukemap.' 0
'This same equation can be used for height, where D is replaced by H which is reference height, and D1
is replaced by H1 which is the height of the bomb detonation.
iOhttp://www.nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/
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Figure 5: Effects radii for a 10 kt yield
The location show in figure 5 is the neighborhood of Downtown in the city of Los An-
geles. This area contains Bunker Hill, fashion district, industrial district, jewelry district,
Little Tokyo, Old Bank District, skid row, and the Civic Center. The Civic Center is the
administrative core of LA and has the largest concentration of government employees in the
United States outside of Washington, DC. This neighborhood has a population density of
4,470 per square mile which is lower than most population densities in LA. The population
in 2008 was 34,811. However, the daytime population is approximately 207,440 which is
about a 500% increase. This is important for weapons effects approximations."
The radius of the fireball, at an optimal height of burst of 1,555 feet, is approximately 0.07
kilometers. At this height the fireball does not touch the ground. The fireball is a source of
extremely bright visible like and can potentially blind an observer. The fireball incorporates
the weapons residue and material from the surrounding medium to form an intensely hot
and luminous mass. This causes it to emit thermal radiation capable of causing burns. Very
soon after the explosion, a blast wave develops in the air and moves rapidly away from the
fireball. The radius of the fireball extends for about one block of the location. From the
blast wave formed, fires can be started by upset stoves, water heaters and furnaces, electrical
short circuits, and broken gas lines. The spread of the fire is determined by the amount and
distribution of combustible materials in the vicinity and will account for a large number
of deaths on the order of tens of thousands [18]. For the remaining calculations it will be
assumed that the attack takes place in the daytime to account for the maximum number of
deaths. Also, because this is an air burst, the effects from fallout will be minimal and are
thus ignored in this scenario.
The 20 psi overpressure extends for 0.6 kilometers, which is about 9 blocks. As shown
in the figure all buildings within this area would be demolished and would account for an
additional 9,000 fatalities. The radiation radius extends for 1.3 km or about 21 blocks.
This radius is calculated for a 500 rem dose. The initial phase of acute radiation occurs
"All population information was found at the following website: http://projects.latimes.com/mapping-
la/neighborhoods/neighborhood/downtown/
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within 30 minutes to 6 hours, with a 100% probability of vomiting. The incidence of death
would be 70%12 and the cause of death would be hemorrhage or infection. Although some
of these deaths would happen in the months following the attack, this would account for an
additional 33,000 deaths. It is important to note that many hospitals are located outside of
the identified effects radii and that through blood transfusions and antibiotics, some of these
people could be saved. The 4.6 psi overpressure extends 1.58 kilometers and the number of
fatalities will vary. The outermost radius shown in figure 5 is the thermal radiation radius.
Within this range approximately 16,000 people would be inflicted with third-degree burns if
their skin was exposed. Therefore, approximately 60,000 people would be killed in such an
attack, in addition to the tens of thousands killed from fires. There would also be a number
of injured people and people with first, second, and third degree burns.
It is also important to note the impact on public works and public services. The gov-
ernance infrastructure would be severely limited with the Civic Center being demolished.
The health care system and emergency services would be strained with the vast amount of
injuries. Using figure 12 located in Appendix 9, the damage distance relationships can be
determined. Thus, any homes within a distance from ground zero of 1.83 kilometers and any
office building within a distance of 0.37 kilometers would be severely damaged and would
have either collapsed or be on the verge of collapsing. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects
could also degrade electrical and electronic system performance [18].
8 Implications
Reviewing Section 7.3.2, Effects on Los Angeles, it is clear the impact a 10 kt bomb would
have on Los Angeles. Presently, it has not been confirmed if the KN-08 missile is capable of
reaching the CONUS. North Korea will have to conduct more tests to make this hypothetical
missile a reality. Even if North Korea was able to manufacture such a missile, without more
tests the missile would be very unreliable. Without further testing it may be that the DPRK
will not attack because they cannot be sure that a missile will reach the United States and
detonate at the optimal height. Furthermore, missile defense might deter such an attack
since it is assumed that North Korea's WGU stock is fairly small and would not want to risk
wasting some of its limited WGU.
Therefore, it is maybe highly unlikely, that the DPRK would conduct such an attack.
However, what steps should be taken to avoid any possibilities? As Jeffrey Lewis stated, "We
ought to be careful about encouraging the North Koreans to prove it to us [19]." By openly
doubting the capabilities of North Korea, the international community could be asking them
to "prove it to us." In the past, this disbelief in capability has led to North Korea and other
countries conducting a variety of tests to flex their weapons capabilities.
Of highest priority, should be the verification of North Korea's nuclear program. By
allowing inspectors back into the country, North Korea would gain some support from the
international community and make their nuclear program more transparent. This trans-
parency would give the international community a better understanding of North Korea's
capabilities. As a country, missile defense has become one of the United States major pri-
"This value was based off of a range of 0-90% incidence of death for doses from 200-600 rems [18].
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orities and by better understanding the capabilities of other countries interested in this
technology, the United States would be able to better defend ourselves from attack.
In years past, the United States and other nations, have tried to provide North Korea
with incentives to cooperate. This technique tends to have the same result: North Korea
accedes for some time, then claims that a deal was misunderstood or not delivered, and
then reneges on the agreement. This leads to sanctions which further damage North Korea's
already weak economy and push it to continue acting against the will of the international
community. In the future, more focus needs to be placed on the goals that North Korea is
attempting to achieve.
Currently, it seems that North Korea's greatest priority in developing its nuclear weapons
capabilities is defense. At present, the Obama Administration is focused on not rewarding
any of North Korea's "provocative behavior". Some advocates suggest imposing stricter
sanctions. The cost of helping North Korea disable its program has also been a cause
for concern. In the future, my recommendation is that instead of giving North Korea oil,
nutritional assistance, or any other incentives, the international community focuses on what
it is that North Korea actually desires for its nuclear programs. In order to do this, there
will have to be a way for diplomatic talks to commence again. These talks need to be
extensive and not focus explicitly on making North Korea dismantle their programs. The
focus, instead, should be placed on the purpose of their nuclear programs. The difficulty in
this exploratory approach is that it may well be that North Korea desires nuclear weapons.
Thus, allowing North Korea some type of defense may help deter them from this path.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
Finally, this thesis attempts to understand and analyze the role of enrichment technology in
North Korea. The history of North Korea displays its dedication to the secrecy of its nuclear
program. The DPRK's interactions with the international community further solidify its
desire to develop its program, even against the international communities' will. This isolation
makes it difficult to communicate and bargain with North Korea. The use of enrichment
technology enables North Korea to produce uranium warheads that could potentially be
loaded onto missiles capable of reaching a variety of targets and maybe the United States.
Because North Korea has threatened to attack U.S. soil, this thesis provides an analysis on
the effects of such an attack. The damaging effects of nuclear weapons are well known, but
the specific location of Los Angeles is a strategic location for many reasons. Los Angeles is
within range of the KN-08 missile, has the second largest population after New York City,
and has the second largest concentration of government personnel after Washington, D.C.,
making it a target of great devastation.
In the future, if North Korea conducts more weapons tests, these test emissions will need
to be carefully studied to help determine the sophistication of their weapons. Space launches
and missile tests will also need to be monitored and analyzed for the application of technology
to ICBM manufacturing. It is highly unlikely that any country, especially North Korea, would
use nuclear weapons. Thus the question often becomes, does it matter if they have nuclear
weapons capabilities? If North Korea continues to advance their capabilities this presents an
even greater threat to the international community. Without better transparency of their
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nuclear programs and goals, it becomes almost impossible to predict North Korea's attack
plans. This creates distress in the international community and puts countries in the region
such as Japan and South Korea on the defensive. This instability will only further lead to
more hostility, weapons testing, and could even escalate to confrontation. Therefore, in order
to maintain stability, it is important that North Korea does not become a nuclear-weapons
state.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Ground Track Geometry Matlab Code
% Ground track geometry
%Launcher @ Musudan-ri (40.85N, 129.67E)
%Target @ Los Angeles,CA (37.07N, 118.39W)
Lt = 34.07; % latitude of target in degrees
It = 118.39; % longitude of target in degrees
Lo = 40.85; % latitude of launcher in degrees
lo = 230.33; % longitude of launcher in degrees, it is important to not that because it is
west the degrees had to be modified.
dl = It - lo;
R = (acosd(sin(Lo)*sin(Lt)+ cos(Lo)*cos(Lt)*cos(dl)))*(10000/90) % Range traced over
the Earth's surface in km
R =-
7.7195e+03
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Appendix B
Maximum Range of Ballistic Vehicle
To find the maximum range of a missile first, the burnout velocity, Vburnout or vf, needs to
be calculated. This is given by the following equation,
Vf = Vex ln(mo/mf) (7)
where Vex is the exhaust velocity of the gas with respect to the rocket, mois the initial
launch weight, and m1 is the final weight. Oftentimes "specific impulse," I,, is used rather
than exhaust velocity as a parameter and is defined by:
Isp = Vex/g (8)
where g is the acceleration of gravity. Furthermore, to calculate the burnout velocity of
a multistage missile, sum the vf values found at each stage[20].
After calculating vf, a trajectory parameter needs to be defined
Qburnout -Vurnout _ VburnoutR(ur)out
circular
whereVbumout is the burnout velocity (or vf), Rbur0 utis the burnout radius, and pis the
gravitational parameter (for the Earth the value is 3.986 x 105km3 /s 2 ).
After Q hnout as been calculated for a specific ballistic vehicle, then the maximum range
angle achievable for that vehicle can be calculated using the following equation,
Amax = 2 sin- 1( Qburnout (10)
2 - Qburnout
which will need to be multiplied by 10,000 km/900 to get the maximum range in kilome-
ters.
It is important to note that these equations are rough estimates and do not apply the
rotating-earth correction [17].
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Appendix C
Maximum Range of Ballistic Vehicle Matlab Code
% Equations for DPRK ICBM
% Parameters taken from John Schilling "An Assessment of the North Korean % KN-08
ICBM
%These constants are specific to KN-08C
% Constants
Isp1 = 225; % seconds
Isp2 = 265; % seconds
Isp3 = 265; % seconds
g = .0098; % km/s^2 gravity
Mol = 18250; % kg initial mass of nodong missile
Mfl = 2325; % kg final mass of nodong missile
Mo2 = 15250; % kg initial mass of R-27 in 2nd stage
Mf2 = 1685; % kg final mass of R-27 in 2nd stage
Mo3 4675; % kg initial mass of R-27 in 3rd stage
Mf3 700; % kg final mass of R-27 in 3rd stage
Mtw 1000; % kg throw weight assuming 1000 kg for warhead
Bh = 300; % km burnout height, average height for ICBMs
Br = Bh + 6378; % km burnout radius
u = 398600; % km^3/s^2
% Velocity at Burnout km/s
Vf= (Ispl*g*log((Mol+Mo2+Mo3+Mtw)/(Mfl+Mo2+Mo3+Mtw)) + Isp2*g*log((Mo2+Mo3+Mi
+ Isp3*g*log((Mo3+Mtw)/(Mf3+Mtw))) % km/s burnout velocity
% Trajectory Parameter
Qb = Vf*Vf*Br/u
% Maximum Range in km
A = real(((2*asind((Qb)/(2-Qb)))*(10000/90)))
Vf =
6.9945
Qb =
0.8196
A =3
9.7733e+03
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Appendix D
Radii of Overpressure
Figures 6 and 7 shown below are used to find the distance from ground zero of overpressure.
Using the optimal height of burst, the scaled height of burst is found using the following
equation,
H,-HOBHi=W1/3 (11)
where H1 is the scaled height, HOB is the optimal height of burst calculated using
equation 6, and W is the yield in kilotons. Using the figures below and the value of H1,
find the distance the overpressure occurs. Then scale the distance back to the actual yield
using equation 5 [18].
[18]
Figure 6: Peak over-pressures on the ground for 1-kiloton burst (low-pressure range).
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Figure 7: Peak over-pressures on the ground for a 1-kiloton burst (intermediate-pressure
range).
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Appendix E
Calculation of the Fireball Radius, Optimal Height of Burst, and
Radii of Overpressure in Matlab
Figures 6 and 7 shown in Appendix 9 are used to find the inputs in the following Matlab
code.
% Size of fireball
W = 10 % kt yield of bomb
Rf = (90*W^.4)*(0.0003048) % km
% Optimum Height of Blast
Hob = (220*W^(1/3))*(3.28084) % ft
Hobkm = Hob*(0.0003048) % in kilometers
%Scaled Height of Burst
hi = Hob/(W^(1/3))
%To calculate the distance an overpressure extends use the scaled height of
%burst to answer prompt
prompt = 'Using graph what is the distance from ground zero at the specified overpres-
sure? ';
result = input(prompt);
Dfb = result;
%Use Dfb to scale back to the actual yield and find the distance
dl = Dfb*(W^(1/3))*(0.0003048) % distance in km
Rfz=
0.0689
Hob =
1.5550e+03
Hobkm
0.4740
h1 =
721.7848
Using graph what is the distance from ground zero at the specified overpressure? 800
d1 =
0.5253
Using graph what is the distance from ground zero at the specified overpressure? 2400
d1 =
1.5760
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Appendix F
Calculating Radiant Exposure
To calculate radiant exposure, first the slant range must be calculated using the following
equation,
r 2 = d 2 + h 2 (12)
where r is the slant range in miles, d is the distance in miles, and h is the height of burst
in miles. The slant range is used with the explosion yield to estimate the radiant exposure
using figure 8 below [18].
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Figure 8: Slant ranges for specified radiant exposures on the ground as a
yield of air bursts at altitudes up to 15,000 feet for a 12-mile visibility.
Furthermore, figures 9 and 10 shown below
estimate the intensity of a skin burn.
function of energy
use the resultant radiant exposure value to
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Figure 9: Radiant exposure required to produce skin burns for different skin pigmentation.
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Figure 10: Skin burn probabilities for an average unshielded population taking no evasive
action as a function of explosion yield and radiant exposure.
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Appendix G
Calculating Prompt Dose (exclusive of fallout)
Dosage is calculated the same way as radiant exposure. First, the slant range must be
calculated in yards. Then figure 11 shown below is used to calculate the dosage [18].
3,010
[18]
Figure 11: Slant ranges for specified gamma-ray doses for targets near the ground as a
function of energy yield of air-burst fission weapons.
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Appendix H
Damage Distance Relationships
Using the graph in figure 12 shown below, and a table in Glasstone that gives the structural
types depicted by the points on the graph, one can estimate the damage-distance relation-
ships for above ground structures. To do this a point is chosen based on the structure then a
straight line is drawn from the point to the yield, which then gives the distance from ground
zero in feet. Points of interest are: 5, which is a wood frame building, and 9, which is a steel
frame office-type building with earthquake resistant construction [181.
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Figure 12: Damage-distance relationships for above ground structures.
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